A Good Place To Start

The Trump Administration has signaled that it plans to expand energy production, expedite energy permitting, and ‘roll-back’ regulations and practices that impede growth. As part of this effort, Mr. Trump has named Lee Zeldin, a former GOP member of Congress, to lead the EPA.
Mr. Trump has stated that Mr. Zeldin wishes to “ensure fair and swift deregulatory decisions” while maintaining “the highest environmental standards, including the cleanest air and water on the planet.’’ Further, Elon Musk and Vivek Ramaswamy, heads of the so-called Department of Government Efficiency, or DOGE, have vowed to work with the Trump Administration to use executive action “to pursue three major kinds of reform: regulatory rescissions, administrative reductions and cost savings.”

While there are many statutorily mandated regulatory programs and practices that are not easily ignored or revised, there are several regulations and practices that impede growth in violation of the governing statute and/or case law interpreting that statute. One area that Mr. Zeldin and DOGE can focus on is the EPA/Corps of Engineers’ regulatory definition and interpretation of ‘navigable waters’ and ‘waters of the United States’ in the Clean Water Act.

Under the CWA, “navigable waters” means the “waters of the United States,” or WOTUS. EPA/Corps promulgated a simple regulatory definition of WOTUS in the early 1970s. Since then, though, EPA/Corps have expanded the regulatory definition, and their interpretations of the CWA and that definition, to include, as stated in Sackett v, EPA, “almost all waters and wetlands across the country [such that they] theoretically could be subject to a case specific jurisdictional determination.” Obviously, an expansive definition impairs growth and prevents development.

Over the years, the US Supreme Court has issued several decisions seeking to clarify the meaning of WOTUS and curtail the EPA/Corps’ ever-expanding view of their jurisdiction. Most recently, the Supreme Court issued its decision in Sackett, which was a full-throated endorsement of Justice Scalia’s plurality opinion in Rapanos v. US. The Sackett Court completely rejected the ‘significant nexus’ test espoused by Justice Kennedy in his concurrence in Rapanos.

In Sackett, the Supreme Court stated that, to be jurisdictional, the adjacent wetlands “must be indistinguishably part of a body of water that itself constitutes ‘waters’ under the CWA.’” According to the Supreme Court, this requires the party asserting jurisdiction over adjacent wetlands, that is, the EPA/Corps, to establish: 1) that the adjacent body of water constitutes WOTUS (i.e., a relatively permanent body of water connected to traditional interstate navigable waters) and 2) that the wetland has a continuous surface connection with that water, making it difficult to determine where the water ends and the wetland begins.

The EPA/Corps, though, do not seem willing to adopt and apply this simple formulation of WOTUS and the resulting jurisdictional scope over adjacent wetlands. Instead, they seem to retain their previous expansive interpretations to maintain or assert jurisdiction over wetlands that should not, post-Sackett, be included within the scope of the CWA.

By way of example, in one pre-Sackett jurisdictional determination, the EPA/Corps relied on the ’significant nexus’ test to assert jurisdiction over isolated wetlands. After a request to review that prior determination in the wake of Sackett, the EPA/Corps determined that the very same isolated wetlands remained jurisdictional. EPA/Corps merely changed the designation of the ditches draining the wetland area to now claim that those ditches provide a ‘continuous surface connection,’ even though in the prior determination they claimed those same ditches were ephemeral at best.

These approved jurisdictional determinations are subject to judicial review under the Administrative Procedure Act. In other words, the recipient may file a petition or complaint for federal judicial review of that AJD. Additionally, since the Supreme Court’s decision in Corner Post, such a review may be filed within six years of the harm or injury from the AJD and not the date of issuance of that AJD. Still, the EPA/Corps should faithfully apply Sackett in the first instance instead of issuing expansive AJDs and requiring recipients to seek judicial review.

There are presumably many fertile grounds for DOGE to attack throughout the federal government. However, the EPA/Corps’ current interpretation of WOTUS stifles, delays, and impairs growth and development, contrary to the Supreme Court’s express ruling in Sackett. Mr. Zeldin and DOGE would help growth tremendously if they addressed this issue as one of their first priorities.

Supreme Court Deals a Blow to the Administrative State

The Supreme Court has overruled Chevron, its forty-year-old decision which has allowed administrative agencies to impose their regulatory will on industries, small businesses, and individuals by requiring that courts defer to an agency’s interpretation of a statute. According to EPA Administrator Regan, the decision “hits EPA extremely hard.”

In general terms, Chevron provides guidelines for a court to review an agency’s action pursuant to an act of Congress using a two-step framework. First, a court must assess whether Congress, in the statute, has spoken directly to the issue at hand and, if so, that is the end of the inquiry as the clear will and intent of Congress must be followed. However, if the statute is silent or ambiguous as to the agency action at issue, the court must, as the second step, defer to the agency’s interpretation if it is based on a permissible construction of the statute. As many statutes are silent or ambiguous as to an issue, Chevron allowed agencies to wield great power to act as long as the action was based on a permissible reading, even if the court did not necessarily agree with that reading.

In overruling Chevron, the Court relied on the intent of the Framers and its traditional role, finding that it has always been the province of the court to interpret the law. The passage of the Administrative Procedure Act (APA) in 1946 did not change this traditional role as the APA codified the traditional understanding that courts must decide all relevant questions of law. The Court stated: “The APA, in short, incorporates the traditional understanding of the judicial function, under which courts must exercise independent judgment in determining the meaning of statutory provisions.”

Chevron changed that approach. Instead of a court interpreting a statute and/or deciding relevant questions of law, an agency was allowed to provide a permissible reading of a statute and a reviewing court was required to defer to that reading. In the Court’s view, Chevron “defies the command of the APA” and “triggered a marked departure from the traditional approach.” As a result, Chevron had to be overruled.

But, what is left in its place? The Supreme Court was somewhat unclear. It did state that a court must find a “best reading” of a statute and answer “the question that matters: Does the statute authorize the challenged agency action?” To get to that ‘best reading,’ the Court provided some guidance.

First, a court may “seek aid from the interpretations of those responsible for implementing particular statutes.” An agency interpretation “may constitute a body of experience and informed judgment to which courts and litigants may properly resort for guidance.” Second, an interpretation “issued contemporaneously with the statute at issue, and which have remained consistent over time, may be especially useful in determining the statute’s meaning.” Finally, a statute may provide some authority for an agency to “exercise a degree of discretion.”

The Court also referenced a decision older than Chevron and the APA, Skidmore v Swift, to provide some criteria for accepting an agency interpretation: The weight or deference provided to an agency “would ‘depend upon the thoroughness evident in its consideration, the validity of its reasoning, its consistency with earlier and later pronouncements, and all those factors which give it power to persuade, if lacking power to control.’” Even if there is now some uncertainty in how to determine whether the statute authorizes the agency’s action, a court cannot simply defer to an agency’s reading of a statute as they have done in the decades since Chevron was decided. Instead, the court must interpret the law and owes little, if any, deference to the agency’s interpretation. As a result, an agency will be unable to issue regulations or take actions that go much beyond the relevant statute.

Enough is Enough

The Corps of Engineers refuses to accept the Supreme Court’s decision in Sackett v. EPA, which substantially reduces the scope of Corps’ jurisdiction over ‘adjacent wetlands.’ The Corps’ “unwillingness to concede its lack of regulatory jurisdiction” prompted the Fifth Circuit to emphatically state “enough is enough” in a recent decision related to adjacent wetlands.

The Clean Water Act regulates the discharge of dredged or fill material into navigable waters. 42 USC §1344(a) (Section 404). Navigable waters are defined as “the waters of the United States, including the territorial seas.” 42 USCA §1362(7).

In Sackett, the Supreme Court held that Corps’ jurisdiction under the Clean Water Act “extends to only those wetlands with a continuous surface connection to bodies that are waters of the United States in their own right, so that they are indistinguishable from those waters.” Sackett, 143 S. Ct. at 1344. The Court also explained that the Corps must establish “first, that the adjacent [body of water constitutes] … ‘water[s] of the United States,’(i.e., a relatively permanent body of water connected to traditional interstate navigable waters); and second, that the wetland has a continuous surface connection with that water, making it difficult to determine where the ‘water’ ends and the ‘wetland’ begins.” Sackett, 143 S. Ct. at 1341.

The Corps has refused to accept this holding and the limitations on its jurisdiction as established by the Supreme Court. The Corps’ current position is that a ‘continuous surface connection’ exists when wetlands are connected to a jurisdictional water by a discrete feature like a non-jurisdictional ditch, swale, pipe, or culvert. Further, a continuous surface connection does not require a constant hydrologic connection. The EPA and Corps echoed this view in guidance released in November 2023 in the form of a PowerPoint presentation.

However, there are two problems with the Corps’ current position. First, the case relied on by the Corps in the November 2023 Guidance does not support its claim. Second, the Fifth Circuit just held that the Corps’ November 2023 Guidance on this point is wrong.

In the November 2023 Guidance, at p. 48, the EPA and the Corps rely on “prior EPA practice” and a Sixth Circuit case, US v. Cundiff, 555 F3d 200 (6 Cir. 2009), for this position. However, that case does not specifically make that statement. The Court actually stated: “Although the term ‘continuous surface connection’ clearly requires surface flow, it does not mean that only perpetually flowing creeks satisfy the plurality’s test.” Cundiff, 555 F3d at p. 212. The Court went on to discuss seasonal flow “and like water bodies.” Waterways with seasonal flow can be relatively permanent waterways. Further, one waterway, the South Channel, provided a continuous surface connection between the wetlands at issue and a traditional waterway (the South Channel had flow for all but a few weeks a year). So, the EPA’s and Corps’ statements regarding non-jurisdictional waters based on Cundiff, if any, are likely dicta.

On Dec. 18, 2023, the Fifth Circuit decided the case of Lewis v. US (2023 WL 8711318), which negates the EPA’s and Corps’ position in the Fifth Circuit. Wetlands on two tracts in Livingston Parish were at issue. The tracts are described as grass-covered, majority dry fields with gravel, logging, and timber roads on the sides of each tract. The owners harvested and managed timber on the tracts. As to the first tract (the east tract), waters flowed through roadside ditches to an unnamed tributary (which flowed intermittently), to Colyell Creek (a relatively permanent waterway), and then to Colyell Bay, a traditional navigble waterway about ten to fifteen miles away. As to the second tract (the west tract), water flowed through roadside ditches to Switch Cane Bayou, to Colyell Creek, and then Colyell Bay.

At the district court level (2020 WL 4798496), the court was reviewing an approved jurisdictional determination (AJD) initially issued in 2017 after an administrative appeal. The 2017 AJD found jurisdictional wetlands, noting the above connections to the traditional navigable waterway. The Plaintiffs argued that there was no jurisdiction under Rapanos (including the Scalia test as to adjacency). At some point in the district court proceedings, the Corps “acknowledged that the land in question does not meet the adjacency requirement set forth under the Scalia test. Accordingly, it provides no basis for CWA jurisdiction.” The district court also found that there was no jurisdiction under the significant nexus test. The matter was remanded back to the Corps.

After remand, the Corps applied the 2020 Navigable Waters Protection Rule to the wetlands on both tracts. The Corps indicated in a 2020 AJD that there were no jurisdictional wetlands on the west tract but found wetlands on the east tract by “connecting (a) roadside ditches and (b) a culvert to (c) an unnamed non-‘relatively permanent water’ tributary, then to (d) Colyell Creek (a ‘relatively permanent water’) several miles away, and ultimately to (e) the traditionally navigable waterway of Colyell Bay ten to fifteen miles from the Lewis property.”

Upon review by the Fifth Circuit and based on these facts, the Court found: “There is no ‘continuous surface connection’ between any plausible wetlands on the Lewis tracts and a ‘relatively permanent body of water connected to traditional interstate navigable waters.’ Recall that the nearest relatively permanent body of water is removed miles away from the Lewis property by roadside ditches, a culvert, and a non-relatively permanent tributary. In sum, it is not difficult to determine where the ‘water’ ends and any ‘wetlands’ on Lewis’s property begin—there is simply no connection whatsoever. There is no factual basis as a matter of law for federal Clean Water Act regulation of these tracts.” Thus, the Fifth Circuit found no continuous surface connection, even though there was a ditch, a culvert, and a non-relatively permanent tributary.

The Lewis decision highlights several important points. First, the Corps admitted under these facts that there was no jurisdiction under the Scalia test in Rapanos (the very same test adopted in Sackett). Second, there was no continuous surface connection even when water may flow through ditches, a culvert, and a non-relatively permanent tributary. Finally, the Sackett holding relating to a determination of where waters ends and wetlands begins was specifically incorporated into the Lewis decision.

As a result of the Lewis decision, non-jurisdictional features (ditches, culverts) and non-relatively permanent waterways are not continuous surface connections and cannot serve to link wetlands on a property to a relatively permanent waterway. On this point, the November 2023 Guidance is not consistent with the Fifth Circuit’s strict and straightforward application of Sackett in the Lewis decision.